We analyze the definitions of generalized quantifiers of imperfect information that have been proposed by F.Engström. We argue that these definitions are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics, and fail to capture an adequate notion of teamtheoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also criticize the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in this context. We make some proposals for a more adequate definition of generalized quantifiers of imperfect information.
Introduction
Languages of imperfect information are a family of logical formalisms which allow the semantical analysis of notions, such as dependence and independence, which cannot be captured by classical first-order logic. Stemming from the partially ordered quantifiers of Henkin ([11] ), logics have been developed which express in full generality functional dependence (Independence-Friendly logic, [12] , [18] , and Dependence logic, [21] ) and other database properties (Independence logic, [10] , Inclusion and Exclusion logic, [9] ), probabilistic independence ( [5] ) and quantum probabilities ( [15] ), just to mention a few examples.
Earlier presentations of these logics ground the semantics on intuitions correlated to Skolemization or to semantic games ( [19] ); however, the unifying background of many of the recent developments in the field is instead the more general team semantics ( [13] , [14] , [21] ). Team semantics is a generalization of the Tarski-style, compositional semantics of first-order logic; according to it, the notion of "satisfaction by an assignment" is replaced by the notion of "satisfaction by a team" (a set of assignments, all sharing a common variable domain). Within this more general framework, it becomes possible to embed in logical formulas notions that go beyond the classical semantics of first-order logic; new concepts can be incorporated in the form of atomic formulas, of special quantifiers, of new logical operators. It is in this spirit that F. Engström ([6] , followed by [7] and [8] ) proposed two definitional schemes for the introduction of generalized quantifiers in Dependence logic; one scheme for the monotone quantifiers, and one for the non-monotone case. He also extended his definitions to slashed and backslashed quantifiers, which are in line, respectively, with the characteristics of Independence-Friendly (IF ) logic, and of Dependence-Friendly (DF) logic. Much in the same spirit, M. Sevenster ([20] ) gave a definition of the "most" quantifier in the context of Independence-Friendly (IF ) logic. In the present paper, we will analyze some aspects of this treatment of generalized quantifiers; we will focus on the slashed, IF version of the generalized quantifiers.
In the following pages, 1) We will argue that Engström's (/Sevenster's) reading of the generalized quantifiers is biased by misleading parallels with first-order semantics. Once a proper, team-semantical, reading of his quantifiers is applied, the need to restrict his definition to the monotone case disappears. Yet, the new quantifiers it applies to do not correspond to the first-order non-monotone quantifiers. 2) We point out the the two definitions of Engström, taken together, manage to model correctly the first-order generalized quantifiers, but this approach works and is meaningful only when the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. 3) We further defend the extension of Engström's first clause beyond the monotone case showing (in a technical appendix) that many good synctactical properties of IF logic are preserved when the new quantifiers are added. In particular, we show that a regularization and a prenex normal form theorem can be obtained, plus some stronger versions of the prenex transformations; adding an almost trivial restriction (that quantifiers do not contain the empty set), one can also show that the primality test ( [20] ) applies. 4) Finally, we suggest that, even when it is freed of the monotonicity restriction, Engström's first first presentation of generalized quantifiers is just a special case of a much more general notion, of which we sketch a definition.
The semantics of IF logic and Engström quantifiers
We summarize here the syntax team semantics of IF logic. As mentioned above, a justification for these rules can be given in terms of a game-theoretical semantics; the interested reader may consult [18] . The syntax of IF formulas is similar to that of first-order logic: we allow the usage of the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬; ¬ is allowed to occur only in front of atomic formulas; the quantifiers are of the form (∃v/V ) ("there is a v, independent of V ") and (∀v/V ). For brevity, we write ∃v and ∀v for the quantifiers (∃v/∅) and (∀v/∅). The set V is called a slash set. The set of bound variables is defined as usual; the set of free variables of a formula ψ, F V (ψ), should be defined with more care, so as to include also those variables from slash sets that do not fall in the scope of quantification over the same variable. So, for example, the IF formula ∃z(∃y/{x})R(y, z) has exactly one free variable, x, in spite of the fact that x does not occur in the atomic part of the formula. Now we move to the team semantics. We present it in its lax variant, as introduced in [6] 1 .
Def 2.1. Given a structure M , a team on M is a set of assignments dom(X) → M , where dom(X) is a finite set of variables. A team is suitable for an IF formula ψ provided that dom(X) ⊇ F V (ψ).
Def 2.2. Given an assignment s : dom(s) → M , an element a ∈ M , and a variable v, we write s(a/v) for the assignment of domain dom(s) ∪ {v} given by:
Def 2.3. Given a team X on a structure M and a variable v, the duplicated team X[M/v] is defined as the team {s(a/v)|s ∈ X, a ∈ M }. Given a team X over a structure M , a variable v and a function F : X → ℘(M ), the supplement team X[F/v] is defined as the team {s(a/v)|s ∈ X, a ∈ F (s)}.
Notice that in case F (s) = ∅ and v / ∈ dom(X), the supplemented team X[F/v] will not contain any extension of s.
Def 2.4. Given two assignments s, s
′ with the same domain, and a set of variables V , we say that s and s ′ are V -equivalent, and we write s
Def 2.5. We say that a suitable team X satisfies an IF formula ψ over a structure M , and we write M, X |= ψ in the following circumstances:
Then one can say that a sentence ϕ is true in M (M |= ϕ) if M, {∅} |= ϕ. Dual clauses (exchanching atoms with negated atoms, conjunctions with disjunctions, existential with universal quantifiers) can be given to introduce notions of negative satisfaction (|= − ) and falsity. In this way, one obtains a three-valued logic; we will be mostly interested in truth.
It is to be remarked that, if we omit the requirement of V -uniformity from the existential case, the above clauses define a semantics for first-order logic, which turns out to be equivalent, at the level of sentences, with the usual Tarskian semantics.
One can more generally define IF * logic, which also allows for slashed connectives. It is necessary then to add two clauses to the semantics:
We now to turn to the quantifiers of Engström.
Def 2.6. A generalized quantifier is an expression R, obeying the same synctactical rules as the usual quantifiers, such that
where each R M is a certain subset of ℘(M ), and X[F/x] = {s(a/x)|s ∈ X, a ∈ F (x)}.
So, each such quantifier can be identified with the class of the R M s, as M varies over all possible structures. The existential and universal quantifiers can be seen as special cases of generalized quantifiers, once one defines ∀ M = {dom(M )} and ∃ M = ℘(M ) \ ∅. Any generalized quantifier Q which is distinct from the universal quantifier and the existential quantifier (that is, in some logic IF ( R) there are formulas ψ and χ, variables u, v and sets U, V such that (Qu/U )ψ ≡ ∀uψ and (Qv/V )χ ≡ (∃v/V )χ) will be called an intermediate quantifier.
We We see that these extensions all satisfy two fundamental properties of IF logic.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ. For IF operators, see the analogous proof for Dependence logic in [21] , 5.1. The only new case is ϕ =
Notice that all passages are correct also in the limit case that X[F/v] = ∅. Proof. By induction.
Finally, we must recall that, according to team semantics, a formula ψ (of IF , IF ( R), etc.) is said to be flat if it satisfies the following condition, for all suitable structures M and teams X:
All first-order formulas are flat; so, flat formulas may be thought as formulas that behave similarly to first-order ones. In IF logic it can be proved ( [17] , Prop. 5.12) that the flat formulas are exactly those that are strongly equivalent (in a precise sense) to first-order formulas.
Reading the generalized quantifiers
Let us fix some notation that will be useful in the following.
Def 3.1. 1) Given a team X such that y ∈ dom(X), and an element i ∈ M , let X(y = i) := {s ∈ X|s(y) = i}. 2) Given V ⊆ dom(X), write X ↾V := {s ↾V |s ∈ X}.
3) Given a team X of domain {x 1 , . . . , x n }, we can write Rel x1,...,xn (X) for the corresponding relation {(a 1 , . . . , a n )|∃s ∈ X∀i = 1..n(s(x i ) = a i )}.
We define monotonicity in the spirit of [6] .
Now, Engström's semantical clause for generalized quantifiers differs from ours in that his definition is explicitly restricted to the monotone case. Concerning this last aspect, Engström comments:
This applies even for non-monotone quantifiers but for those quantifiers Q the truth condition above does not make a whole lot of sense as the following example shows. Let M = N and Q = {A} where A is the set of even numbers. According to the truth condi-
Further reasons why such an example should not make sense did not follow. The choice of this quantifier seems to be somewhat unfair. Even in the context of first-order (Lindström) generalized quantifiers, the subset class Q = {A} does not define anything that would be, in an intuitive sense, called "a quantity". But there are plenty of classes of subsets that, in spite of being non-monotone, correspond (at least in the first-order setting) to a notion of quantity. An example, also considered by Engström, is the quantifier "there are exactly two", corresponding to the class of subsets {S ⊆ M |card(S) = 2}. And although there are examples of classes that do not correspond to intuitions on quantity, the study of non-monotone quantifiers is not considered improper in the context of Lindström quantifiers.
But there is a more general problematic aspect in Engström's reading of generalized quantifiers, which stems from a difference between the semantics of first-order (open) formulas and IF (open) formulas. Indeed, first-order (and, more generally, flat) open formulas are satisfied by assignments, and thus express things about elements and tuples of elements of the domain; while open formulas of IF logic are satisfied by teams, and thus express properties of sets and relations. Correspondingly, the typical first-order quantifiers assert that a formula holds for a quantity of elements. We should expect, then, that the typical generalized quantifiers for team logics state that a formula holds for a certain quantity of sets; and perhaps, as a second dimension, it could express the size of the sets). Thus, the interpretation Q M of a quantifier Q in a structure M should not be a subset of ℘(M ), but a subset of ℘(℘(M )). In an extension of IF logic, it should be legitimate to say things like "ψ holds for most six-element sets", "there is a set of size smaller than three for which ψ holds", "ψ holds on all cofinite sets", and so on. It may seem at first that Engström's definition does not take into account this shift in abstraction levels; indeed, both his notion of generalized quantifer and Lindström's put the quantifiers in correspondence with sets Q M ⊆ ℘(M ). But upon closer inspection, we see that the sets Q M are used in rather different ways in each of the two definitions. Let us consider for example the sentence θ : ∀x∃ =2 yP (x, y), which can be seen both as a (generalized) first-order sentence and as a (generalized) IF sentence. According to first-order semantics and Lindström's definition,
. This may be expressed as a condition on teams, but it does not correspond to the usual notion of supplementing (and Engström's definition for the non-monotone cases is probably intended to bridge this gap). Instead, team semantics yields:
This is a different meaning; it states that for all assignments s s.t.
. This is a weaker condition; it does not require that the set [θ] M,s of all a ∈ M such that s(a/y) satisfies P to be an element of ∃ M =2 ; but only that, for each s, we can pick a subset of [θ] M,s that falls in ∃ M =2 (and whose assignments all satisfy P (x, y)). So, under team semantics, the very same sentence is true in more models than in the first-order case. Now, notice that we can express the truth condition of the above sentence, under team semantics, as:
=2 (see the notation above). But this can also be written as
that can be thought of as the higher-order meaning of the quantifier ∃ =2 . The fact that∃ M =2 can be expressed in function of the first-order ∃ M =2 is an accident which is specific of Engström's definition; more quantifiers could be defined whose meaning cannot be reduced to the first-order case. We will return on this point in the last section.
Let us focus our attention on two more examples, which should help us grasp better the difference between the Tarskian and the team-theoretical interpretations, and also some accidental, and deceitful, similarity that they can display. We begin with a monotone quantifier, the "most" quantifier of Sevenster. For simplicity, consider just an occurrence of this quantifier at the beginning of a sentence. We think that the proper interpretation of M, {∅} |= mostyψ in IF logic should be that "there is a set (of ys), containing most element of M , such that ψ holds of this set" (not on this set, which would mean that ψ holds of each single element in the set; we are treating ψ as a global, or plural, property of the set). Incidentally, if ψ is a first-order IF formula, this assertion is equivalent to "ψ holds of most y". This is due 1) to the flatness of first-order formulas (M, X |= ψ iff M, s |= ψ for all s ∈ X iff M, {s} |= ψ for all s ∈ X) and 2) to the monotonicity of the quantifier. Concerning 1), we stress that, for formulas that are not flat, it simply makes no sense to say that "ψ holds for most elements". And also in the case of flatness, if we want to stick more properly to team semantics, we should say that "ψ holds for most singletons".
Concerning 2), we consider as a second example the quantifier ∃ ≤2 , such that ∃ M ≤2 is the set of at-most-two-element subsets of M . It is not monotone; we will see that, if a quantifier is not upwards closed, the interpretation of sentences can easily diverge from the intended first-order meaning, even when the quantifier is applied to flat formulas. Indeed, ∃ ≤2 is clearly not the quantifier "there are at most two"; this is because any sentence ∃ ≤2 yψ, with ψ first-order, is trivially true in team semantics (since ψ is satisfied by ∅, see Theorem 2.8) . Similarly, the non-monotone quantifier ∃ =2 (such that ∃ M =2 is the set of two-element subsets of M ) is not modeled correctly. Let ψ be a first-order formula of one free variable x. Clearly, according to team semantics the sentence ∃ =2 xψ is satisfied in any domain where ψ applies to at least two elements, and this is not the intended first-order meaning.
In order to understand better the distinction we made above between a property holding of a set, or rather on a set, we may consider Aczel's higher order definition of (first-order) generalized quantifiers ( [1] ). IfR is a secondorder unary predicate (applying to one unary first-order predicate variable), we can define the first-order generalized quantifier R by the clause:
This clause express the on reading: ψ holds of every element of the set X. How can we express instead the of reading, and thus the semantics of Engström quantifiers? We just need to raise Aczel's definition to a third-order formula. Let R be a third order predicate applying to a second-order unary predicate of the same type as theR above; andŶ a variable of the same type asR; then, one can define a quantifier over sets as:
this captures the of meaning (ψ expresses something about X, not about its elements). We will discuss in the last section how to implement this idea in team semantics.
To conclude the present section, we remark that Engström, in his [6] , gives an interesting justification of his definitory clause by analogy with the process of lifting the semantics of the existential and universal quantifiers from first-order to IF logic. It seems we can find a flaw in his argument precisely in the fact that the existential and universal quantifiers are monotone, and thus not sufficiently generic to be the basis of a generalization.
Capturing the non-monotone quantifiers
In the previous section, we saw that the monotone Engström quantifiers happen to have the usual, first-order meaning whenever they are applied to first-order formulas; and also, that this coincidence fails to apply in case the quantifier is non-monotone. One may wonder whether there is some different notion of non-monotone quantifier in team semantics which, when applied to a first-order formula, gives the same results as would obtain by Tarskian semantics. Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is yes. Engström gave a second semantical clause, meant to cover both the monotone and non-monotone quantifiers. We briefly recall it. For functions F,
This clause is successful in its purpose: 1) on monotone quantifiers, it gives the same results as the previous definition ( [6] , Prop.2.10), and 2) a F O(R) formula ψ is satisfied by a team X if and only if each assignment s ∈ X satisfies ψ in the Lindström sense ( [6] , Prop.2.11).
However, the reader would probably not be surprised, at this point, to see that even this more refined definition fails to capture the intuitive first-order reading of the quantifier when the quantifier itself is applied to an IF formula. We show an explicit example. Consider the quantifier ∃ =ω such that ∃ M =ω = {S ⊆ M |card(S) = ω} (in the first-order reading, "there are countably (and not finitely) many"). Now, since IF logic is capable of talking of bijections, we should expect to be capable of expressing, in IF (∃ =ω ), the concept C that "there are countably many x that can appear in the domain of a bijection of range N ". The mere existence of a bijection of the domain with N can be expressed by the IF sentence ∀x∀y(∃u/{y})(∃v/{x, u})(x = y ↔ (u = v ∧ N (u))) as can be seen using the usual Skolemization procedure (adding two existential second-order quantifiers ∃f, ∃g, eliminating the first-order existential quantifiers, replacing u with f (x) and v with g(y)).
So, it seems reasonable that the existence of countably many x that can be in the domain of a bijection with N be expressed by
If (M, N ) is a structure of uncountable domain, with N ⊂ M a countable set, the statement C should be false (because there are uncountably many such x: all x ∈ M ). Yet, the formula ϕ is true in M . Indeed, let F : {∅} → M be any function such that card(F (∅)) = ω; fix a bijection g : The seemingly paradoxical nature of this result disappears as soon as we read ∃ =ω in its team theoretical acception; then we can see that ϕ just states the fact (true precisely in any domain such that card(N M ) = ω) that there are countable sets that can be put in a bijection with N .
It must be remarked that we cannot expect to be able to define the concept C in IF logic, because it is well-known that IF logic (which has the Löwenheim-Skolem property, and can express bijections) cannot define the countability of a set. We are left to wonder whether it is possible to define some kind of generalized quantifier extension of IF logic that expresses C.
Conclusions, towards a higher-order definition
The moral of the discussion above is that Engström's definitions of generalized quantifiers (his first definition, restricted to monotone quantifiers; and the second clause for non-monotone ones) must be taken as a clever idea to embed the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics; not as a proper and exhaustive notion of generalized quantifiers for logics of imperfect information. Moreover, these quantifiers can be interpreted in the first-order sense only when applied to flat formulas.
If instead the quantifiers are given a team theoretical, higher order reading, as statements about sets and relations, the first definition makes perfect sense also without the (first-order) monotonic restriction, and it seems to work adequately well also from the proof-theoretic point of view (see the appendix). Furthermore, no special clause for non-monotonicity (in the spirit of Engström's second definition) is needed in this case. Indeed, under the second-order reading, all the Engström quantifiers are monotonic quantifiers. To make this remark more concrete, we consider the quantifier ∃ =2 , "there exists a set of two elements", which will be defined by the sets∃
is a monotone subfamily of ℘(℘(M )): if S contains a set S of cardinality 2, and S ⊆ T ⊆ ℘(℘(M )), then also T contains S; thus T is in∃
Have this kinds of remarks already appeared in the literature? To the best of our knowledge, there is only one 2015 paper ( [4] ) in which the first-order nature of Engström quantification is lamented, and the definition of a properly team theoretical "Most" quantifier is attempted. We will briefly discuss it in the end.
So, what could be a reasonable definition of the generalized quantifiers of imperfect information, that may include (all) the Engström quantifiers of def. 2.6 as a special (second-order monotone) case? As we said, we want it to be a higher order definition; so, each quantifier will be identified with a class of setŝ R M ⊆ ℘(℘(M )) (one for each structure M ). We may try then to suggest what the general semantic clause of such a quantifier should look like. We begin with the case of unslashed quantifiers. Given a team X such that y ∈ dom(X) and s = s ′ −y for some s ′ ∈ X, let
be the set of values that are assigned to y in the y-equivalence class of s. Given an IF (R) formula ψ and a team X such that dom(X) contains all the free variables of ψ except possibly y, we define the family of sets satisfying ψ in y:
Then the semantics we suggest for a type 1 quantifier R is:
Extending the definition to slashed quantifiers (Ry/V ) poses no difficulties: it suffices to impose in the definition (1) Any Engström quantifier R (as defined by 2.6 can be captured by our definition if we identify it with the class of familiesR M = {S ∈ ℘(℘(M ))|∃S ∈ S(S ∈ R M )}. Instead, the Engström non-monotone quantifiers (see def. 4 in the present paper) can be captured by our semantical clause if identified withR
,nm , paralleling the fact that asserting that "there exists a twoelement set satisfying ψ" is not the same as asserting that "there is a two-element set satisfying ψ, and any set satisfying ψ has exactly two elements".
Under this more general notion of quantifiers, it is sensible again to ask whether the definition works adequately for quantifiers that are non-monotone in the second-order sense. That is, quantifiers R such that
The answer is yes: we illustrate it with an example (that could well serve as a model for a general argument).
We consider the quantifier "there are finitely many countable sets such that...", defined as∃ M <ω,=ω = {S ∈ ℘(℘(M ))|card(S) < ω ∧ ∀S ∈ S(card(S) = ω)}. There exists (by the Kontinen-Väänänen theorem, [16] ) an IF formula ψ(x) (of one free variable) which, on the structure (N, +, ×) for Peano arithmetic, is satisfied exactly by all sets of prime numbers (more rigorously: it is satisfied by all teams X of domain {x} such that, for all s ∈ X, s(x) is a prime number). Then, ψ is satisfied by infinitely many sets of prime numbers: we should expect that N |= ∃ <ω,=ω xψ. Does our clause (1) Now, these quantifiers are in a sense bidimensional. The quantifier considered above, ∃ <ω,=ω , defines a quantity ("finitely many") of sets of a certain quality ("countable ones") to satisfy a formula. This stretches further our need to accept that formal definitions of quantifiers capture notions that have not much to do with intuitions about quantity, nor it is clear what restrictions one may put on the formal definitions in order to exclude "pathological" cases. But it seems not to be unreasonable to make some proposals. It might be reasonable to require, if we do not want intuitions on quantity to be violated, that, if a family of sets of a certain quantity is in the meaning of the quantifier, then all families of the same size fall in the meaning of the quantifier. In symbols:
In this way, the qualitative dimension of quantifiers is completely eliminated. A less radical idea could be that of treating this way all families of sets which are of the same quality. We need a precise definition of the quality of a subfamily of ℘(℘(M )); we might suggest the following: on each structure M ,
S ∈ S} (the family of all sets that occur in some family ofR M ). Then we decide to accept as quantifiers only the familiesR M ⊆ ℘(℘(M )) that satisfy:
This condition is sufficient to exclude such bizarre quantifiers as "There are n sets of cardinality n, for some n", while, for example, tolerating the quantifier ∃ <ω,=ω that we discussed above.
As we mentioned above, there has been already at least one proposal of a properly higher-order, team-theoretical quantifier. Durand &t al. ( [4] ) studied a "Most" quantifier defined by the following semantical clause:
So, Most yψ means that ψ is satisfied by most supplementing functions. It seems evident that such quantifier fits not as a special case of our general definition; it is a unary quantifier which says something about a unary function. Our quantifiers express things about sets and relations; so, only a binary quantifier of our kind could talk about unary functions (and those would be functions M → M , not X → M ). Yet, we cannot exclude a priori that the Most quantifier can be embedded in our framework in some convolute way, exactly as the first-order generalized quantifiers could be embedded by Engström into team semantics. So, we give an (easy) impossibility proof. 
Proof. Here X ↾F V (ψ) means {s ↾F V (ψ) |s ∈ X}. The claim can be proved by induction on the structure of ψ. The cases corresponding to first-order logical operators are treated, for example, in [21] Lemma 3.7.
Suppose instead ψ = R i yχ, where χ is a F O( R) formula with empty slash sets. Then,
So, the above condition is equivalent to {(
This locality property is known to fail for F O(Most) ( [4] , Prop. 2.13); so, there is no way to express Most using our definitional scheme. It seems thus that the topic of functional quantifiers is somewhat orthogonal to our approach; and we might lament that the supplementing functions have no direct link with the extensional meaning of a formula. Yet, one can not dismiss so easily the functional approach, because the existence of functions plays a crucial role both in the team and the game-theoretical semantics of logics of imperfect information. * * * A Appendix: equivalence rules for IF * ( R)
In section 3 we argued that there is no reason to restrict Engström's first definition of generalized quantifier to the monotone case. We further defend this idea by showing that some good logical properties (in particular, prenex transformations and the primality test) can be extended beyond monotone extensions of IF (or IF * ) logic. Our proofs will follow the model of [2] , although now we must take care of the fact that functions from a team to ℘(M ) are considered; and of the strange things that may happen if some function has the emptyset as one of its values. (In the monotone case, the only quantifier which is affected by this exception is the trivial quantifier T M = ℘(℘(M ))). We also borrow some abbreviations from that paper; for example, we omit union symbols in synctactical expressions; we occasionally write, instead of finite sets of variables, a corresponding list; we write s −v for the restriction of s to dom(s) \ {v}; X −v for the restricted team {s −v |s ∈ X}; we write ψ /V for the formula which is obtained from ψ by adding the variables of V to each of the slash sets. Futhermore, we denote by s[z/x] the assignment which is obtained replacing each element of the form (x, a) with an element (z, a); we denote as X [z/x] the team {s[z/x]|s ∈ X}; and by ψ[z/x] the formula obtained from ψ by replacing each free occurrence of x with z. And, most importantly, we state all the rules in terms of Z-equivalence: given a finite set of variables Z, two IF * formulas ψ and χ are said to be Z-equivalent, in symbols ψ ≡ Z χ, if:
For all teams X such that dom(X) ∩ Z = ∅, and for any structure
(This notion of equivalence must not be confused with the alternative approach of "relative equivalence" pursued in [18] , or with the special case of "safe equivalence" of [3] ).
We need a rule for the extraction of ∀, ∃ and R i quantifiers in IF ( R). We can reuse the proof schema of the analogous result for IF * from [2] ; but since that proof is based on many intermediate results, we need to check carefully that the lemmas generalize to our case. 
Def A.2. Given a team X, and V ⊆ dom(X), we define X ↾V = {s ↾V |s ∈ X}. The following is the extraction rule we need.
Lemma A.4. For any formulas ψ, χ of IF * (R), any variable v not occurring in χ, V nor W , and Q being either ∀, ∃ or an intermediate R,
Proof. For the cases Q = ∀, ∃ see the proof of Theorem 7.5 in [2] . We examine the case Q = R. The requirement that v / ∈ V ∪W ensures that the non-triviality condition for v-equivalence is respected.
⇒) This part of the proof does not differ significantly from the corresponding existential case in [2] , Theorem 7.5 
|= ψ (from which it follows that M, X 1 |= (Rv/V )ψ) and, thanks to Lemma A.3 (which is applicable since v / ∈ dom(X)), M, X 2 |= χ. Clearly X 1 ∪ X 2 = X, otherwise the Y i would not cover X[F/v]. We check that the X i are W -uniform. Suppose s ∈ X i , t ∈ X, s ∼ W t. Then, by lemma A.1,
The following basic result holds as usual:
Lemma A.5 (Interchanging free variables). If x / ∈ Bound(ψ) and z does not occur in ψ, then for any structure M and any suitable team X such that x ∈ dom(X) and z / ∈ dom(X),
Theorem A.6. Let z be a variable not occurring in (Qx/X)ψ, where Q is either ∀, ∃ or R i . Then: a) If x does not occur bound in ψ and does not occur in X, then
Proof. a-b) The proof of [18] , Theorem 5.37, applies almost without changes.
The notions of regular 5 and strongly regular formula from [2] are also sensible in our context. An IF * ( R) formula ψ is strongly regular if each variable is quantified at most once in it.
Lemma A.8. Let ϕ and ϕ(χ/ψ) be regular IF
Proof. One can use the proof of Theorem 9.6 in [2] , checking that the lemmas it depends on (6.14, 6.16, and our A.5) and their proofs are also valid for IF * ( R).
Theorem A.9 (Strong regularity). Any IF ( R) (resp.IF * ( R)) formula ψ is V -equivalent to a strongly regular IF ( R) (resp.IF * ( R)) formula ψ ′ , for some V ⊆ Bound(ψ ′ ); ψ ′ can be chosen so that Bound(ψ) ∩ Bound(ψ ′ ) = ∅.
Proof. The proofs of 9.3 and 9.4 from [2] still work, using Theorem A.6 and A.8.
Theorem A.10 (Prenex normal form). Every IF ( R) (resp.IF * ( R)) formula is ∅-equivalent to a IF ( R) (resp.IF * ( R)) formula in prenex normal form.
Proof. It can be proven as in [2] , 10.1, finding first a strongly regular equivalent (theorem A.9) and the using carefully renaming (Theorem A.6 ) and quantifier extraction (Theorem A.4) .
The prenex normal form theorem does not exhaust the discourse about prenex transformations. As observed in [2] , the (weak) extraction rule that we gave above is somewhat unsatisfactory, in that it does not yield as a special case the quantifier extraction rule of first order logic. We want to show that a strong extraction rule (analogous to [2] , Theorem 8.3) can still be obtained for union-closed quantifiers.
To make it work in the IF * ( R) case, we need some tools for eliminating variables from singleton slash sets of slashed disjunctions. The following somewhat unintuitive rule is similar (but less general) to an analogous (and as unintuitive) result for ∀, Lemma 8.2 of [2] ; the proof is a bit more involved. 
Proof. The condition v /
∈ V ensures the non-triviality of the equivalence relation.
For the left-to-right implication, just notice that any v-uniform partition of a team is also a partition (without further specifications). For a comparison, the above mentioned result 8.2 of [2] allows transforming a disjunction of the form ∨ /W v , occurring immediately below ∀x, into ∨ /W (in our version for R, W must be empty). For ∃ there is a rather different property which allows the transformation of ∨ /W v into ∨ /W below an existential quantifier (∃x/V ): it works under the hypotheses that W ⊆ V and v / ∈ V (8.1 of [2] ).
In the following we use the notation ψ| v to denote the formula which is obtained from ψ when one adds variable v to all the nonempty slash sets.
